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GLOBALIZATION OF NAVY SHIPBUILDING
A Key to Affordability for a New Maritime Strategy
Robert J. White
The Navy states that 313 ships are necessary to support U.S. national securityrequirements. To build this fleet, the service is requesting a significant in-
crease in its shipbuilding budget. Both the Government Accountability Office
and the Congressional Budget Office contend that the Navy request under-
estimates true shipbuilding costs. Worse yet, current budget pressures and his-
torical budget trends leave even the lowest budget figure in jeopardy. How then
can the Navy make its plan affordable? To meet shipbuilding requirements it
must look beyond domestic industrial sources and fully exploit the comparative
advantages of globalization.
Globalization exploits the advantages of multiple
countries through not only labor and technology but
also “trade, finance, production, and even the rules of
national economies and how they relate to each
other.”1 Its impact on manufactured goods is complex
and widespread. Today the meaning of an American
or Japanese label on a computer or automobile is
problematic, in that over two dozen components
come from more than half a dozen countries.2 A
“made in the United States” security requirement has
become an arcane vestige of the industrial age. At best,
it is a comfortable fantasy. At worst, it is a waste of na-
tional resources. In practice, in fact, it is already a fic-
tion. One needs to look no farther than the HARM,
Patriot, and Tomahawk missiles or the “Marine One”
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presidential helicopter to realize that foreign sourcing is already well under way
in military systems.
Can global production reduce the Navy’s shipbuilding cost risk? This article
examines such a strategy to rationalize the budgetary means with the shipbuild-
ing goals of the U.S. Navy.3 The service needs to exploit the efficiencies of foreign
shipyards to meet its force planning goals. Globalization should be embraced as
an affordability measure within the new maritime strategy now being
formulated.
THE 313-SHIP NAVY
The United States is a maritime nation. “More than 80 percent of the world’s
trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link.”4 As a result, American
economic prosperity is contingent upon the freedom of the seas, and U.S. Navy
primacy is the only reliable guarantor of that freedom for the United States and
the international community. To maintain that primacy, in February 2006 the
Navy laid out the details of a new plan for a 313-ship navy.5 During congressio-
nal testimony the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated:
The 2007 Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels is an invest-
ment plan that is both executable and affordable based on balancing several factors:
naval force operational capability, risk, and the ability of the shipbuilding industrial
base to execute the plan. . . . Full funding and support for execution of this plan is
crucial to transforming the Navy to a force tuned to the 21st Century and built upon
the foundation of Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet. . . . As part of the QDR [Quadren-
nial Defense Review] process, the Navy used a capability-based approach to calculate
the size and composition of the future force. . . . The analysis concluded that a fleet of
about 313 ships is the force necessary to meet all of the demands and to pace the most ad-
vanced technological challengers well into the future, with an acceptable level of risk.6
If we accept at face value the figure of 313 ships as representing the tools re-
quired to execute the Navy’s portion of grand strategy—that is, to support na-
tional goals with acceptable risk in the envisioned security environment—what
remains is to rationalize resource constraints. Unfortunately, while the Navy be-
lieves the plan is executable and affordable, the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) sums up the reality of the situation: “The Navy plan requires more
funds than may reasonably be expected.”7
The Cost Risk of the 313-Ship Navy
In press reports even before Admiral Mullen’s comments, the Navy announced
that it would require an average of $14.4 billion annually for new ship construc-
tion over the next thirty years.8 This represented a 37 percent increase over the
2000–2005 average of $10.5 billion in annual new ship-construction funding.9
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A 2006 GAO report questioned the accuracy of the Navy estimate. It analyzed
the cost growth in the construction of four ships, each the “lead ship” of a new
class, over the period from fiscal year (FY) 1996 to 2006. This analysis revealed
an average increase of 27 percent over initial budget estimates.10 According to
the report, the Navy plan scheduled nine new lead ships for construction be-
tween fiscal years 2006 and 2016.11 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is
even less confident than GAO in the Navy’s numbers. Because of significant cost
growth in recent Navy shipbuilding programs, the CBO projects the actual re-
quirement to be $19.5 billion, a 35 percent increase over the Navy estimate—and
a nearly 100 percent increase over recent budgets.12 Add on a CBO estimate of
support ships missing from the Navy plan, and the annual costs reach $21.7 bil-
lion (see figure 1).
Funding Risk
Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have increased the need to replenish and re-
place existing weapon systems. For this purpose the Department of Defense
doubled its planned investments in ongoing major weapons programs over the
Future Years Defense Plan for 2001 to 2006, from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion,
and increased its annual procurement budget 33 percent, from $75 billion in
2006 to $100 billion in 2010.13 These increases will cover present weapon system
procurement but little more. On top of this, the new Navy shipbuilding plan
doubles required funding from $8.7 billion in 2007 to $17.2 billion in 2011 and
maintains it at that level.14 Worse yet, the Navy plan, the Army’s Future Combat
System, and the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter programs will
be competing for increased procurement funds simultaneously.15 In this envi-
ronment can the Navy truly expect to receive 17 percent of the 2011 Defense
procurement budget for new ship construction alone, when it receives around
10 percent today?16
Further, Navy and Defense Department requirements are not the only pres-
sures on discretionary funding. Rising costs for health care, education, veterans
W H I T E 6 1
New Construction Only
Navy shipbuilding budget in recent years 10.5
Navy estimate of cost of 30-year plan 14.4
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan 19.5
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan plus additional ships needed to
fully support all elements of 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run
21.7
FIGURE 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL SHIPBUILDING COSTS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 2007 DOLLARS PER YEAR)
Source: Adapted from O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans, p. 17.
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affairs, transportation, natural resources, and the environment all make rising
claims on this same pot of money. The fiscal reality becomes even bleaker when
three facts are considered. First, the administration took on the global war on
terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq while cutting taxes. Second, Defense
Department funding is historically cyclical, and a downturn is now likely (see
figure 2). Finally, Defense
funding is shrinking as a
percentage of gross domes-
tic product (or GDP—see
figure 3). In fact, the de-
fense budget is to be cut
from 3 percent of GDP in
2011 to 2.4 percent in
2024.17 Realistically, an in-
crease in neither the Navy
“top line”(total allocation)
nor the Defense Depart-
ment budget should be
expected.
THE NAVY CONTINGENCY PLAN
Admiral Mullen acknowledges that funding for his plan must come out of the
existing Navy budget top line.18 The Navy contingency plan therefore relies, ac-
cording to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, on the conflu-
ence of five factors: limiting increases in personnel costs, prioritizing
shipbuilding budgets and construction rates, limiting increases in operations
and maintenance (O&M) costs, reducing research-and-development (R&D)
funding, and preventing upward “requirements creep” and cost growth in ship-
building programs.19 Unfortunately, these factors are not completely within
Navy control.
The first of these factors, personnel costs, currently accounts for 65 percent of
the Navy budget. The service is reviewing personnel requirements with a view to
reducing this figure. Military personnel needs were studied in FY 2006, while ci-
vilian personnel and contractor services personnel will be studied in fiscal 2007
and 2008, respectively. But the effectiveness of reducing personnel costs to hold
or reduce the budget line may be limited by congressionally mandated raises in
pay (i.e., military/civilian pay-parity actions in every year of the Bush adminis-
tration except 2007) or end strength, as the Army experienced in 2006. The sec-
ond factor, prioritizing shipbuilding, means lowering funding in other
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FIGURE 2
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY, FY 1946–2011
Source: Steven Kosiak, Historical and Projected Funding for Defense: Presentation of the FY 2007 Request in Ta-
bles and Charts (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 7 April 2006), p. 4.
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This is not practical ,
given the influence of avi-
ation in a carrier-based
Navy and the need for
smart standoff weapons
(cruise missiles, extended-
range munitions, etc.) for
the high-priority “strike”
mission. Of what use is a
carrier strike group with-
out aircraft and weapons?
Third, the Navy’s plan to
limit O&M costs is contingent upon keeping surface ships on line for their full
thirty-five-year service-life expectancy; in fact, however, ships remain in service
for significantly less time.20
Fourth, reducing R&D costs is problematic. Arguably, the U.S. Navy’s funda-
mental advantage is in technology. It is not possible to build “upon the founda-
tion of Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet” without innovative research and the
developmental technologies it generates. Even if the Navy were in the future to
use only commercial off the-shelf (COTS) technology, R&D funding would be
required to ruggedize equipment for shipboard use and integrate it with existing
systems. Further, Defense acquisition training stresses that the cost of fixing
problems in a new system escalates by orders of magnitude as it matures from an
idea through design to production and deployment. Thoroughness in the re-
search and development phase is the key to avoiding these problems. How then
will a reduction in Navy R&D funding limit cost growth in a ship’s construction
or its logistical and maintenance support once in service? Experience shows just
the opposite. The fifth and final factor, limiting upward pressure on require-
ments and therefore cost, may be a bridge too far, as evidenced by the GAO and
CBO studies. Moreover, aside from mission, it is the rapid pace of technology
that drives requirements creep.21 So if holding the line on requirements may
limit cost growth, it will also diminish the technology advantage that ships take
to sea.
Innovative thinking, then, will be required if the Navy is to build the 313-ship
fleet. What keeps the Navy from building affordable warships?
W H I T E 6 3
FIGURE 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS A SHARE OF GDP, FY 1910–2011
Source: Kosiak, Historical and Projected Funding for Defense, p. 12.
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DOMESTIC SHIPBUILDING
The commercial American shipbuilding industry is virtually nonexistent. What
remains today is wholly dependent on a domestic market guaranteed by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (known as the Jones Act).22 Though once compet-
itive in the world market, U.S. industry no longer exports any vessels.23 Today,
commercial vessels can be built in South Korea for a third of the price of compa-
rable ships built in the United States.24 In fact, a Korean shipyard can deliver a
new ship for what an American shipyard pays for steel alone.25
The American military shipbuilding industry is concentrated in six shipyards
run by two prime contractors.26 Their sole customer is the U.S. Navy. As the Navy
shrank from the eight-hundred-ship fleet of World War II to the roughly
280-ship fleet of today, the shipbuilding industry consolidated. Unfortunately,
however, while the Navy modernized, industry fell behind. Facing no competi-
tion, U.S. shipyards became inefficient and outdated. Today’s U.S. Navy combat-
ants are highly sophisticated and more lethal than ever, yet they are constructed
in essentially the same manner as they were sixty years ago. Instead of reinvent-
ing processes to remain competitive as foreign shipyards did, U.S. yards relied on
“Buy American” legislation. Analysis completed in 2005 showed that Navy and
industry initiatives are closing the productivity gap with foreign shipyards;27
nonetheless, American shipyards remain fifteen years behind foreign peers.28
Industry blames low and unstable production rates for high material costs
and low productivity. But those factors have existed for sixty years. Moreover, to-
ward the end of the Cold War the Defense Department recognized that military
demand would no longer generate the economies of scale required for afford-
able production. The present emphasis on dual-use technology, relaxation of
former requirements to use military-specification components where industry
specifications are sufficient, and the preference for COTS items wherever possi-
ble have all been outgrowths of that realization. Unfortunately, their effective-
ness has been limited by the segregation of U.S. shipbuilding between the
commercial and military sectors. Few shipyards work in both.29
Commercial shipbuilding, then, depends solely on protectionist legislation,
and military shipbuilding hides conveniently behind national-security claims.
The Department of Commerce states this claim succinctly: “It is essential that
the capability and infrastructure needed to build these [military] ships is resi-
dent in the United States because it provides added assurance that they can be
built, repaired, and maintained during times of conflict.”30 The problem with
maintaining such a “surge” capability is twofold. First, as the Commerce Depart-
ment freely admits, maintaining excess industrial capacity drives up cost and de-
grades competitiveness. Between 1997 and 2002 the cost of a surface combatant
rose 30 percent above inflation;31 in comparison, competition and overcapacity
6 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2007.vp
Thursday, September 13, 2007 3:41:19 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc. du/nwc-review/vol60/iss4/7
in shipyards on the world market drove the price of a new commercial vessel
down 19 percent.32 Second, the complexity of modern combatants renders a
World War II–style mobilization entirely infeasible.33 In fact, a three-to-five-
year construction cycle means that a warship ordered at the beginning of a con-
flict is not likely to be available before the end.34 Further, it is plainly unrealistic
to believe that all foreign shipyards in friendly and allied countries “would si-
multaneously turn down revenues and deny access.”35 Finally, as early as 1988
the national security strategy recognized that defense industrial mobilization is
not a unilateral matter but requires coordination between the United States and
its allies. In the words of President Ronald Reagan, “Fortress America is an obso-
lete concept.”36
GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION
Globalization is not new. Certainly the increasing rate of globalization since
World War II is significant, but as Stephen Brooks contends in his book Pro-
ducing Security, the real difference in the latter half of the twentieth century was
the introduction of geographically distributed production.37 In this “globaliza-
tion of production” an item may cross international borders repeatedly in vari-
ous stages of manufacture. Finished products can represent “work done in ten,
twenty, or even thirty countries.”38 Cheap transport and the free flow of capital
allow companies to combine the advantages (e.g., in labor costs, technological
prowess, heavy industry, banking, government subsidies, etc.) of any number of
countries in a single product. Such cost-benefit analysis is continual: when the
advantage shifts, so too does capital, always seeking the path of least resistance.
Unlike Sir Norman Angell in his famous book The Great Illusion (1912), Brooks
does not guarantee peace or forecast the end of war. Instead, he concludes that the
globalization of production is a new economic force for increasing international se-
curity. He adds it to the list of other great-power stabilizers, such as “democratic
peace” (the presumed disinclination of democratic states to go to war), nuclear
weapons, and international institutions.39 He draws a second conclusion as well:
“No state, including great powers, can now effectively remain on the cutting edge of
military technology if it does not pursue significant internationalization in the pro-
duction of weaponry.”40 The opportunity cost of autarky is too high: it wastes re-
sources replicating goods and services available competitively abroad; worse still, it
denies these resources to the exploitation of domestic advantages.
Military shipbuilding requires a combination of heavy manufacturing and
high-tech systems integration. Foreign shipyards have the heavy manufacturing
advantage in building ships of low to medium complexity for the bulk transport
and cruise industries. For its part, the United States designs and builds the most
advanced warships in the world. The American shipbuilding advantage resides
W H I T E 6 5
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in the area of complex combat systems that integrate shipboard, and increas-
ingly offboard, weapons fire control, sensor, and navigational systems. Integra-
tion is the value added by U.S. industry.
Assume for the moment that U.S. Navy, federal, and state government funds
were available to bridge the fifteen-year gap between American and foreign
shipyards. There is no doubt the United States could eventually become compet-
itive on the world market. But what is the opportunity cost of spending these re-
sources to develop heavy manufacturing? Is internationally competitive
shipbuilding the “value proposition” of the Navy after next? No. The Navy says
the future resides in FORCEnet systems that integrate today’s platform-centric
combat systems with tomorrow’s off-board manned and unmanned sensors and
systems. That places the focus on developing and building these network-centric
technologies. This is the indigenous technology necessary for national security,
not heavy industry. Globalization of warship production would allow the
United States to focus on its strengths today and tomorrow.
Globalization in U.S. Military Systems
Global production of military systems, like globalization itself, is nothing new.
In fact it is a firmly established trend, even within the U.S. military. The presi-
dential helicopter (actually a squadron of them), known as “Marine One,” is a
case in point. Presidents have been flying in Sikorsky helicopters since 1957.41
Sikorsky is a U.S. company and a subsidiary of United Technologies, another
American company. Yet today’s Sikorsky Marine One variant of Sea King air-
craft, the VH-3D, contains a cockpit made in Taiwan, a fuel system and landing
gear made in Brazil, a tail fin and stabilizer made in the People’s Republic of
China, and a main cabin made in Japan.42 The VH-71, which will become the
Marine One aircraft in 2009, will be a foreign design built by Lockheed Martin
fronting for Agusta Westland, a joint British and Italian firm.43 Is the Marine
One of today or tomorrow truly “made in the United States”?
In 1992 the Commerce Department studied subcontracting in three Navy
weapons systems: the Mark 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) Torpedo, the
AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) Missile, and the VLF Digital In-
formation Network (VERDIN) communications system. It found that 13 per-
cent of subcontracting went to foreign firms.44 A 2006 Defense study found that
2 percent of all weapons system procurement went to foreign prime contractors.
In fact, a detailed analysis of twelve weapons systems, including the Patriot Ad-
vanced Capability (PAC3) Missile, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, and
the Tactical Tomahawk Missile, indicated that 10 percent of subcontracts went
to foreign vendors.45 In contrast, only 4 percent of the material purchased by
military shipbuilders is of foreign origin.46
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A Quick Calculation: Global Warship Production
Global warship production would allow the Navy to combine the advantages of
heavy manufacturing in foreign shipyards and systems integration in the U.S.
defense industry.47 Assume that the cost of a domestically manufactured war-
ship without its combat system is $200 million. Since, as evidence suggests,
high-tech combat systems account for roughly one-third the total cost of a ship,
completing the vessel adds $100 million, for a total of $300 million.48 But a South
Korean yard could build the same ship, less its combat system, for $67 million.
Add back in the U.S.-built combat system, and the total outlay is $167 million—
the globally manufactured warship is just over half as expensive as the domesti-
cally produced vessel. Granted, this is an oversimplified comparison; for in-
stance, the additional outfitting costs of integrating the hull with the combat
system would be substantial. Yet there is plenty of room to pay for outfitting at a
domestic shipyard, as well as for “unknowns” like requirements growth, and still
save money.
A THOUSAND-SHIPYARD NAVY
Like all new initiatives, global production of warships is not without risk. First,
ownership of resources means that shipyards are available when needed; reli-
ance on foreign yards weakens this guaranteed availability. Whatever the finan-
cial incentives of foreign industry to deliver, politics creates a whole different
calculus for foreign governments. But this risk can be “bought down,” by spread-
ing it across multiple international partners—a “thousand-shipyard Navy.” The
vision is illuminating. It connotes a network of international partners, informa-
tion sharing, and interoperability like that underlying the “thousand-ship
Navy.” Friends, allies, and partners find ways of working together. A recent case
involving the delivery of a German-built MEKO-type frigate to Australia illus-
trates this flexibility: the German government refused to send the vessel directly
to the Persian Gulf, because of policy disputes over Iraq, but it was more than
willing to allow delivery in Australia itself.49
Domestic resistance can easily be envisioned as well. Congress, industry, and
unions are certainly stakeholders and must be included in the strategy develop-
ment process. Objections to foreign sourcing are well known. They revolve
around loss of jobs, industrial facilities, and, consequently, political clout.
Certainly the risk of losing U.S. jobs is significant. The aircraft and automo-
bile industries are examples by which to gauge the potential impact. Yes, jobs
were lost, and industry was threatened as foreign sources were introduced. To
mitigate the risk to domestic shipbuilding, then, start small with a single new
class. Use Northrop Grumman or General Dynamics, owners of the six major
domestic naval shipyards, as the system integrator and final outfitter (or divide
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the two functions between them). As success builds, more classes can follow; if
the strategy falters, it can be modified or scrapped while domestic capacity re-
mains. In the aircraft and automobile industries, international competition
greatly increased the productivity of American workers and increased pay com-
mensurately. Both industries survived and rewarded customers with better
products. Similar results are reasonable to expect in the shipbuilding industry.
Political objections need to be addressed with Congress, in advance and then
continuously thereafter. “Buy American” restrictions increased sharply in the
1980s, but waivers and exceptions are available to circumvent them.50 In addi-
tion, recent defeats of new restrictions are evidence that these hurdles can be
surmounted when addressed proactively.51 Finally, as the current wrangling over
the VH-71 presidential helicopter proves once again, all agreements are subject
to constant maintenance and review.52 But in the end, as stated by the Depart-
ment of Defense in its 1989 report on “Buy American” restrictions, “The United
States could not build Fortress America even if this were a desirable object. Nor
could the Department of Defense reverse worldwide economic trends, such as
the internationalization of manufacturing.”53
The first step to global production warships is to separate high-tech combat
and mission systems from the remainder of the vessel. The Navy is already start-
ing down this path with the introduction of “mission modules” for the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS). This allows the Navy to build a multimission hull, special-
ized for given tasks by swapping modules in and out. This partitioning would
have the additional advantage in a foreign-sourcing context of separating export-
sensitive technology. The Navy can foreign-source a hull without export-restriction
issues. This concept also isolates within the mission modules any requirement
changes involving high-tech development. Separating risk in this way would im-
prove the Navy’s ability to manage cost growth associated with requirements-
and-mission creep, as identified in Admiral Mullen’s contingency plan. It would
also facilitate replacing outdated combat systems during overhaul periods.54
This in turn would reduce modernization costs required to keep surface com-
batants fully mission capable over their entire intended service lives. Achieving
full service life reduces O&M costs, at least for new ship classes, again per the
Navy’s contingency plan.
The second step is to procure the hull abroad. Our quick calculation showed
that the Navy can reduce costs by buying hulls from foreign sources, buying
combat systems domestically, and then paying a domestic shipyard to fit out the
hulls with its systems and set them to work. Unfortunately in the case of LCS,
hulls were bought domestically. Just four months after launching the first ship,
the Navy was forced to issue a stop-work order and then subsequently cancel
LCS-3 because of significant cost overruns on the construction of LCS-1 and
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projections for LCS-3.55 Speculation puts “significant” at anywhere from an ad-
ditional $100 million to $200 million.56
One of the most important challenges facing the U.S. Navy is recapitalizing the
fleet for the future. Whether the service decides to remain based on nuclear air-
craft carriers or change its focus to alternative vessels, it will need to build
ships—and shipbuilding costs continue to rise. The Navy understands that it is
unlikely to receive additional shipbuilding funds. Therefore, its current ap-
proach to building the fleet involves “nested” strategies to contain shipbuilding
costs, generate business efficiencies, and free up funds from other areas. To do so
the Navy must, as we have seen, limit increases in personnel costs, prioritize ship-
building budgets and stabilize construction rates, limit increases in operations
and maintenance costs, reduce research and development funding, and prevent
requirements creep and cost growth. This shipbuilding strategy is fraught with
risk. It is contingent upon factors the Navy may influence but cannot control.
Worse still, it does not exploit U.S. defense industry strengths; it trades away
high-tech competitive advantage for what is at best heavy industry parity.
In 1988 President Ronald Reagan stated, “Even if we could afford, economically
and militarily, to chart our National Security Strategy without allies—which we
cannot—we would not want to do so.”57 Twenty years later, the “Thousand-Ship
Navy Global Maritime Network” and the global production of new ships both
support that implied desire for cooperation in a new maritime strategy.58 In the
thousand-ship navy, cooperation is achieved as a “fleet” regionally coalesces be-
hind common security goals and objectives. In global production, cooperation is
further enhanced by market economics. In the worldviews of the United States
and its partners, security and economics are mutually supporting, and both are
compelling. They are two sides of the same coin. If a “thousand ships” can work,
so can a “thousand shipyards.”
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